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Legalism 
ano Realism 
in the Gulf 
Sheila Carapico 
In 
his State of the Union address in January, 1998, Presi? 
dent Clinton won thunderous applause for threatening to 
force Iraq "to comply with the UNSCOM regime and the will 
of the United Nations." Stopping UN chemical and biological 
weapons inspectors from "completing their mission," declared 
the President, defies "the will of the world." In the next three 
weeks, the White House ordered a massive show of force in 
the Gulf. Even traditional hawks, however, realized that a 
bombing mission could undermine American hegemonic in? 
terests in the Gulf that are served by a continuation of the 
sanctions regime. 
For seven years, the Bush/Thatcher-Clinton/Blair policy has 
been to continue the Gulf war through a sanctions regime 
with five components, three of them multilateral and two uni? 
lateral: a weapons embargo; a civilian trade embargo, modi? 
fied under the "oil for food" provisions; ongoing inspections, 
monitoring and surveillance of Iraqi military facilities by in? 
ternational civil servants; "no-fly zones" patrolled by US forces; 
and periodic punitive air strikes. This regime serves at least 
three major, long-standing US interests in the Gulf. 
The success of the United Nations Special Commission on 
Iraq (UNSCOM) in coercive arms control is unprecedented, 
with systematic destruction of more Iraqi weapons than fire? 
power destroyed in Desert Storm. With virtually its entire con? 
ventional offensive arsenal dismantled, there is now reason to 
suspect that Iraq has developed lethal biological and chemi? 
cal weapons capacities that are threatening precisely because 
they can be produced in small factories. Continued inspec? 
tions, video surveillance, mandatory reports and monitoring 
of facilities by international experts constitute the best pos? 
sible guarantee that Saddam Hussein's military will not de? 
velop and deploy nerve gas or germ warfare. The US also 
independently scrutinizes Iraqi military movements using spy 
planes and post-radar technology. 
Since the discovery of the Gulf region's oil riches, Britain 
and America have sought to dominate the strategic waterway 
and its coastlines, always looking for permanent military and 
naval facilities. With the cold war over, this is now the most 
important deployment in the world, the centerpiece of Penta? 
gon strategizing, budgets and procurement. If Iraq were found 
to be in compliance with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 687 (SC687)?in other words, if it could show that 
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it has dismantled its offensive weapons capabilities, including 
its chemical and biological weapons systems?many of the 
roughly 18,000 US troops who stay busy policing the "no fly 
zone" would be redeployed. Base and pre-positioning rights, 
especially in SaudiArabia, might have to be renegotiated. As 
long as sanctions remain in place, however, the US and its ally 
Britain are positioned to control Persian Gulf exports to the 
rest of the world. 
In addition, despite the protection of trade embargoes 
against several major oil-exporting nations, petroleum prices 
are falling. Precipitous sale of Iraqi oil could glut an already- 
saturated market, benefiting Baghdad at the expense of two 
important sets of oil-exporters: the rich Arab potentates of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), now under US mili? 
tary protection; and other, more populous petroleum produc? 
ing nations whose sales barely cover interest on their foreign 
debts, most notably Mexico and Indonesia. For Indonesia 
alone, teetering on the brink of default, even a modest dip in 
the world price for its primary export could spell disaster. 
Already the Suharto dictatorship, never censured by the US 
government for its rapacious annexation of East Timor, has 
had to cancel aircraft purchases from the US and imposed 
austerity on its people. Amidst volatility in global stock mar? 
kets, instability in energy prices could send shivers through? 
out the fuel, defense and banking industries. The Wall Street 
Journal, among others, has reported the privileged position 
of French, Italian, Russian and Malaysian oil companies, 
ready to take advantage of any loosening of oil sanctions, to 
the detriment of US oil giants. While Moscow and Paris hope 
to profit from an opening of the Iraqi market, American al? 
lies and businesses favor tightly-controlled sales of Baghdad's 
petroleum. 
Facts and Figures/The Impact of Sanctions in Iraq 
Population1 
GDP/capita2 
18.1 million (1989) 
$2840(1989) 
21.2 million (1997) 
$200(1997) 
Birth rate3 (annual average) 
Death rate 
Annual Growth Rate 
Total Fertility Rate (average births per woman) 
40.3/1000 (1985-90) 
7.2/1000 (1985-90) 
3.3% (1985-90) 
6.15 (1985-90) 
38.4/1000 (1990-95) 
10.4/1000(1990-95) 
2.8% (1990-95) 
5.70(1990-95) 
Infant mortality rate4 
[deaths to children lessthan one year of age/1000 live births] 
Child mortality rate5 
[deaths to children lessthan five years of age/1000 live births] 
80(1985-90) 
40 (1985-90) 
160(1994-95) 
198(1990-95) 
While 
the accuracy of statistics demonstrating the impact of United Na? 
tions anctions on Iraq cannot be fully determined, there is no question 
that heir impact has been severe. Infant mortality has doubled from the pre- 
sanctions era, with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reporting a 
fivefold increase in mortality among children under age five. While the latter 
figure may be overstated,6 the health and nutritional profile of young children 
remains very poor, with an estimated 30 percent of children suffering from 
chronic or acute malnutrition.7 Kwashiorkor and marasmus?symptoms of 
severe protein-deficiency and usually seen only in famines?are increas? 
ingly common. In explaining this situation, diverse sources point to a combi? 
nation of "poor nutrition a d increased prevalence of disease?compounded 
by inadequate health services"8?this in a country where, prior to the Gulf 
War, more than 90 percent of the population had access to primary health 
care. Maternal mortality is also believed to have increased several times ince 
1991, although ard data are not available.9 
Other statistics reflecting the impact of the sanctions include a two-thirds 
decrease in the number of calories per capita supplied by government food 
rations; a 12-fold increase in the incidence of typhoid; and a 90 percent drop 
in per capita income (GDP/capita). According to the World Health Organiza? 
tion (WHO), "The vast majority of the country's population has been on a 
semi-starvation diet for years."10 
Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iraq imported some 70 percent of its 
food. Under the sanctions regime, the government a tempted to increase 
agricultural production, but productivity has been limited by the lack of in? 
puts (machinery, pesticides, water), as well as by increasing soil salinity. An 
FAO Mission to Iraq in the summer of 1997 found that 25 percent of young 
men and 16 percent of young women show signs of chronic energy defi? 
ciency, reflecting the reduced availability of food over the past seven years.11 
This report also cited a number of nutrients missing from present-day diets 
in Iraq, vitamins Aand C most notable among them. Before sanctions, 93 
percent of urban and 70 percent of rural residents had access to potable 
water. Currently more than half of rural residents do not have access to clean 
water. Studies by UNICEF (1994) and WHO (1996) cited bacterial contami? 
nation in at least 30 percent of samples tested?also partly to blame for the 
increases in disease and mortality in the country. 
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Even after the Security Council passed a resolution as? 
serting its intention to retain decision-making power in re? 
sponding to any Iraqi breach, the Clinton foreign policy team 
declared that earlier resolutions already authorized a mili? 
tary response to infractions of what Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright began calling an "inspections regime." 
In fact, this was nothing like 1993 when US warplanes uni? 
laterally retaliated against Iraqi military incursions into 
Kurdish "safe havens" under the controversial, but recogniz? 
able, doctrine of "humanitarian intervention." This time, af? 
ter Iraq failed to admit American inspectors to sensitive sites, 
the White House claimed a mandate under the November 
1990 SC678, the Gulfwar resolution, to punish whatAlbright 
deemed a"material breach" of the April 1991SC687, which 
imposed sanctions, and SC718, which created the UN Spe? 
cial Commission. 
This spurious legalistic argument ran afoul of issues that 
had bedeviled the UNSCOM regime all along. First, although 
SC686, which brought a provisional end to the hostilities, does 
expressly reserve the authorization to use "all necessary 
means" to force compliance with subsequent resolutions, it 
also leaves judgment on these matters to the Security Coun? 
cil, not individual states. Second, although none of the four 
UN resolutions spells out the precise conditions that Iraq must 
meet before sanctions are lifted, the American assertion that 
punishment must continue as long as Saddam Hussein rules 
Iraq is legally untenable. Most experts agree that once in? 
spectors certify an end to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
program, sanctions end. Already in October 1997, Russia and 
France proposed easing the trade embargo in light of the sig? 
nificant reduction in Iraq's nuclear and missile arsenal uncTer 
UNSCOM supervision. The US and the UK resisted, insist? 
ing that their inspectors could ferret out suspected secret 
chemical and biological laboratories. This touched on the UN's 
sensitivity about neutrality and the multi-nationality of 
UNSCOM inspections teams, which, while nominated by their 
governments, are supposed to be drawn from as many coun? 
tries and regions as possible, with particular care to avoid 
staffing with experts from"intelligence-providing states."These 
issues made it possible for the Iraqi dictator to complain that 
through their domination of the UNSCOM positions 
Anglos and Americans were moving the goal posts, deliber? 
ately prolonging the inspections and providing intelligence 
directly to governments that were planning to attack the very 
sites to which access was demanded. 
The arsenal assembled for this exercise in gunboat diplo? 
macy displayed the latest weapons, some of them designed 
specifically for the Iraqi arena: titanium-tipped cruise mis? 
siles, bunker-penetrating and satellite-guided bombs, and the 
Sensor Fused Weapon that carries multiple "skeet" 
submunitions each with target-seeking heat sensors. In Feb? 
ruary, 28,000 men and women were deployed to the Gulf. The 
Pentagon had ready detailed plans for penetrating under? 
ground installations, detonating presidential compounds and 
neutralizing the Iraqi Republican Guard. Within the military- 
industrial establishment, from the perspective of troop mo? 
rale in a post-Somalia era and from commercial media outlets 
Middle East Report ? Spring 1998 
that love to hate Saddam, there is a certain imperative to use 
the expensive new weapons. The deployment alone cost an 
estimated $100 million per day. 
Bombing on this pretext, however, would be like using dy? 
namite to find the needle in a haystack. Before an attack on 
the scale threatened could commence, all UNSCOM weapons 
inspection teams (currently carrying out 95 percent of their 
inspections) would have to evacuate and monitoring would 
cease. Humanitarian missions and the "oil-for-food" program 
would also be suspended. Furthermore, because the Security 
Council is not prepared to back military action, the multilat? 
eral elements of the sanctions regime would be dismantled. In 
addition, Iraq's neighbors' refusal to allow air strikes to be 
launched from their soil could create political as well as logis? 
tical problems. Most importantly, destruction of Iraq's mili? 
tary and social infrastructure would almost certainly bring 
chaos and further suffering that could easily engage US and 
 
perhaps British, Canadian or European soldiers in a massive 
humanitarian undertaking. 
At home, there is a strand of public opinion that favors 
bombing Iraq on principle, because its ruler is so bad that, like 
the figures hunted down by Clint Eastwood or Arnold 
Schwartzenegger, he needs to killed. But the foreign policy 
team's sales pitch was booed not only by Vietnam-vintage heck? 
lers but also American bishops, already on record in favor of 
expanding oil sales to meet the humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqi people. Similarly, a wide range of public opinion, from 
left to right, questions the utility of a bombing campaign. 
For all these reasons, UN secretary General Kofi Annan's 
diplomatic success was not incompatible with US interests 
in the Gulf. Unlike the 1990/91 resolutions, the new "deal" 
contains specific language expanding the scope of inspections 
and enforcing compliance. Despite other Security Council 
members' protestations, in the event of a future transgres? 
sion, Washington will claim clear authorization for punish? 
ment under the new resolution. In the meantime, Iraqi oil 
sales will be regulated, even as the food-for-oil allowances 
are expanded. Gunboats and aircraft carriers will remain in 
a state of readiness for action. A potentially deep rift in the 
Gulf war coalition remains, but its consequences are averted, 
and existing basing rights maintained. The status quo of in? 
ternationally mandated US military hegemony in the Gulf 
remains largely intact. 
Students of international relations call this sort of arrange? 
ment a hegemonic regime, wherein imperialist powers del? 
egate certain tasks to multilateral organizations. The IMF, 
for instance, imposes conditions on debtor nations that would 
be difficult for creditors to impose unilaterally. If US soldiers 
were doing the work of UNSCOM, they would be an army of 
occupation. Without UNSCOM, the US presence in the Gulf 
would be acknowledged as offensive, not acceded to as defen? 
sive. Although US has often flaunted international law and 
its mechanisms?for instance, in mining Nicaraguan har? 
bors, violating Security Council resolutions affecting Israel, 
refusing to pay UN dues?in this particular instance the mul? 
tilateral features of the sanctions regime go hand-in-glove 
with imperialist ambitions. While some in Congress claim 
the Pentagon is doing the UN's bidding, elsewhere many 
people think just the opposite. 
Real long-term US interests, however, do favor the genu? 
ine autonomy and integrity of the UN's arms control regime 
in Iraq. A farsighted policy would project monitoring of weap? 
ons of mass destruction to the Middle East region as a whole 
even beyond the Iraq sanctions regime. There is little evi? 
dence of this in Washington, where discussion focuses on the 
personality of Saddam Hussein and a well-worn litany of his 
sins, thus reducing the question to "what shall we do about 
this evil madman" rather than "how can we prevent weap? 
ons proliferation?" For all the talk about"taking out Saddam," 
one wonders where American policy in the Gulf would be 
without him. 
The status quo is not sustainable indefinitely. The stan? 
dard television image of 'the Gul?" of US oil rigs and aircraft 
carriers glittering over flat sand and water, is something of a 
mirage. Current American policy still clings to the now-out? 
moded notion of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. Even 
after a thaw in relations with Tehran, however, all 
Washington's eggs are in the fragile GCC basket. The rela? 
tionship of the US to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the 
other kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula is not one of classi? 
cal metropolitan-client relations. The Arab Gulf states are 
paying customers who set strict limits on foreigners in their 
countries. One of the ironies of the recent crisis is that inter? 
national television reporters enjoy greater access to Baghdad 
than to Riyadh. The Gulf monarchies' survival may be in? 
versely related to their loyalty to US military aspirations in 
their region. The uncertain futures of all the Arab govern? 
ments of the Gulf region, as well as the huge stockpile of 
weapons in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, should pro? 
vide strong incentive for prudent policymakers to empower 
an autonomous weapons inspections apparatus. ? 
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